Immediately after World War II, the American archaeologist Robert Braidwood (Braidwood et al. 1983 ) pioneered the systematic study of agricultural origins. From the known antiquity of village sites in the Near East and from the presence of wild ancestor species of many crops and animal domesticates in the same region, Braidwood inferred that this area was likely a locus of early domestication. He then embarked on an ambitious program of excavation in the foothills of the southern Zagros Mountains using a multidisciplinary team of archaeologists, botanists, zoologists, and earth scientists to extract the maximum useful information from the excavations. The availability of 14C dating gave his team a powerful tool for determining the ages of the sites. Near Eastern sites older than about 15,000 B.P. excavated by Braidwood (Braidwood and Howe 1960 ) and others were occupied by hunter-gatherers who put much more emphasis on hunting and unspecialized gathering than on collecting and processing the seeds of especially productive plant resources (Goring-Morris and Belfer-Cohen 1998; Henry 1989) . Ages are given here as calendar dates before present (B.P.), where present is taken to be 1950, estimated from 14C dates according to Stuiver et al.'s (1998) calibration curves. The Braidwood team showed that about 11,000 years ago, hunter-gatherers were collecting wild seeds, probably the ancestors of wheat and barley, and were hunting the wild ancestors of domestic goats and sheep. At the 9000 B.P. site of Jarmo, the team excavated an early farming village. Using much the same seed-processing technology as their hunter-gather ancestors 2,000 years before, the Jarmo people were settled in permanent villages cultivating early-domesticated varieties of wheat and barley.
Numerous subsequent investigations now provide a reasonably detailed picture of the origins of agriculture in several independent centers and its subsequent diffusion to almost all of the earth suitable for cultivation. These investigations have discovered no region in which agriculture developed earlier or faster than in the Near East, though a North Chinese center of domestication of millet may prove almost as early. Other centers seem to have developed later, or more slowly, or with a different sequence of stages, or all three. The spread of agriculture from centers of origin to more remote areas is well documented for Europe and North America. Ethnography also gives us cases where hunters and gatherers persisted to recent times in areas seemingly highly suitable for agriculture, most notably much of western North America and Australia. Attempts to account for this rather complex pattern are a major focus of archaeology.
Origin of Agriculture as a Natural Experiment in Cultural Evolution
The processes involved in such a complex phenomenon as the origin of agriculture are many and densely entangled. Many authors have given climate change a key explanatory role (e.g., Reed 1977:882-883 ). The coevolution of human subsistence strategies and plant and animal domesticates must also play an important role (e.g., Blumler and Byrne 1991; Rindos 1984) . Hunting-and-gathering subsistence may normally be a superior strategy to incipient agriculture (Cohen and Armelagos 1984; Harris 1977) , and, if so, some local factor may be necessary to provide the initial impetus to heavier use of relatively low-quality, high-processing-effort plant resources that eventually result in plant domestication. Population pressure is perhaps the most popular candidate (Cohen 1977) . Quite plausibly, the complex details of local history entirely determine the evolutionary sequence leading to the origin and spread of agriculture in every region. Indeed, important advances in our understanding of the origins of agriculture have resulted from pursuit of the historical details of particular cases (Bar-Yosef 1998; Flannery 1986). Nonetheless, we propose that much about the origin of agriculture can be understood in terms of two propositions:
Agriculture Wcas Impossible During The Last Glacial. During the last glacial, climates were variable and very dry over large areas. Atmospheric levels of CO2 were low. Probably most important, last-glacial climates were characterized by highamplitude fluctuations on time scales of a decade or less to a millennium. Because agricultural subsistence systems are vulnerable to weather extremes, and because the cultural evolution of subsistence systems making heavy, specialized, use of plant resources occurs relatively slowly, agriculture could not evolve.
In The Long Run, Agriculture Is Coinpulsory In The Holocene. In contrast to the Pleistocene, stable Holocene climates allowed the evolution of agriculture in vast areas with relatively warm, wet climates, or access to irrigation. Prehistoric populations tended to grow rapidly to the carrying capacity set by the environment and the efficiency of the prevailing subsistence system. Local communities that discover or acquire more intensive subsistence strategies will increase in number and exert competitive pressure on smaller populations with less intensive strategies. Thus, in the Holocene, such inter-group competition generated a competitive ratchet favoring the origin and diffusion of agriculture. ' The great variation among local historical sequences in the adoption and diffusion of agriculture in the Holocene provides data to test our hypothesis. In the Near East, agriculture evolved rapidly in the early Holocene and became a center for its diffusion to the rest of western Eurasia. At the opposite extreme, hunting-and-gathering subsistence systems persisted in most of western North America until European settlement, despite many ecological similarities to the Near East. Thus, each local historical sequence is a naturcal experiment in the factors that limit the rcate of cultural evolution o*f more intensive subsistence strcategies. For our hypothesis to be correct, the evolution of subsistence systems must be rapid compared to the time cognitively modern humans lived under glacial conditions without developing agriculture, but slow relative to the climate variation that we propose was the main impediment to subsistence intensification in the late Pleistocene. By cultural evolution we simply mean the change over time in the attitudes, skills, habits, beliefs, and emotions that humans acquire by teaching or imitation. In our view (Bettinger 1991; Boyd and Richerson 1985) , culture is best studied using Darwinian methods. We classify the causes of cultural change into several "forces." In a very broad sense, we recognize three classes of forces: those due to random effects (the analogs of mutation and drift), natural selection, and decision-making (invention, individual learning, biased imitation, and the like). The decision-making forces will tend to accelerate cultural evolution relative to organic evolution, but by how much is a major issue in the explanation of agricultural origins. Figure 2. High-resolution analysis of the GRIP ice core 6180 data by Ditlevsen et al. (1996) . The low-pass filtered data shows that the Holocene is much less variable than the Pleistocene on time scales of 150 years and longer. The highpass filtered data shows that the Pleistocene was also much more variable on time scales less that 150 years. The highand low-pass filtering used spectral analytic techniques. These are roughly equivalent to taking a 150-year moving average of the data to construct the low-pass filtered series and subtracting the low-pass filtered series from the original data to obtain the high-pass filtered record. Since layer thinning increasingly affects deeper parts of the core by averaging variation on the smallest scales, the high-pass variance is reduced in the older parts of the core. In spite of this effect, the Pleistocene/Holocene transition is very strongly marked.
Was
and thinning within the ice core progressively erases high-frequency variation in the core (visible as the narrowing with increasing age of the 150-year highpass data in Figure 2 ), the shift from full glacial conditions about 18,000 years ago to the Holocene interglacial is accompanied by a dramatic reduction in variation on time scales shorter than 150 years. The Holocene (the last relatively warm, ice free 11,600 years) has been a period of very stable climate, at least by the standards of the last glacial. (West 2000) . The Younger Dryas episode has received disproportionate attention because the timc period is easily dated by 14C and is sampled by many lake and mountain glacier cores too short to react older millennial-scale events. As Cronin (1999 202-221) If losses in the Holocene are this high and if highfrequency climate variation in the last glacial increased at lower latitudes roughly as much as at Greenland, a hypothetical last-glacial farming system would face crippling losses in more years than not. Devastating floods, droughts, windstorms, and other climate extremes, which we experience once a century, might have occurred once a decade. In the tropics, rainfall was highly variable (Broecker 1996) . Few years would be suitable for good growth of any given plant population. Even under relatively benign Holocene conditions agriculturalists and intensive plant collectors have to make use of risk-management strategies to cope with yield variation. Winterhalder and Goland (1997) use optimal foraging analysis to argue that the shift from foraging to agriculture would have required a substantial shift from minimizing risk by sharing to minimizing risk by field dispersal. Some ethnographically known Eastern Woodland societies that mixed farming and hunting, for example the Huron, seemed not to have made this transition and to have suffered frequent catastrophic food shortages. Storage by intensive plani collectors and farmers is an excellent means of meeting seasonal shortfalls, but is a marginal means o1 coping with inter-annual risk, much less multi-yeaw shortfalls (Belovsky 1987:60) . 3 If Winterhalder and Goland are correct that con. siderable field dispersal is required to manage Holocene yield risks, it is hard to imagine that fur, ther field division would have been successful at coping with much larger amplitude fluctuations that occurred during the last glacial. We expect that opportunism was the most important strategy for managing the risks associated with plant foods during the last glacial. Annual plants have dormant seed that spreads their risk of failure over many years, and perennials vary seed output or storage organ size substantially between years as weather dictates. In a highly variable climate, the specialization of exploitation on one or a few especially promising species would be highly unlikely, because "promise" in one year or even for a decade or two would turn to runs of years with little or no success. However, most years would likely be favorable for some species or another, so generalized plant-exploitation systems are compatible with highly variable climates. The acorn-reliant hunter-gatherers of California, for example, used several kinds of oak, gathering less favored species when more favored ones failed (Baumhoff 1963: Table 2 ). Reliance on acorns demanded this generalized pattern of species diversification because the annual production of individual trees is highly variable from year to year, being correlated within species but independent between species (Koenig et al. 1994). Pleistocene hunter-gatherer systems must have been even more diversified, lacking the kind of commitment to a single resource category (acorns) observed in California.
The evolution of intensive resource-use systems like agriculture is a relatively slow process, as we document below. If ecological time-scale risks could be managed some way, or if some regions lacked the high-frequency variation detected by the as yet few high-resolution climate proxy records, the evolution of sophisticated intensive strategies would still be handicapped by millennial-scale variation. Plant and animal populations responded to climatic change by dramatically shifting their ranges, but climate change was significant on the time scales shorter than those necessary for range shifts to occur. As a result, lastglacial natural communities must have always been in the process of chaotic reorganization as the climate varied more rapidly than they could reach equilibrium. The pollen record from the Mediterranean and California illustrates how much more dynamic plant communities were during the last glacial ( per unit CO2 fixed, exacerbating the aridity characteristic of glacial times. Beerling (1999) (Beerling 1999) . Diamond (1997) argues that the rate of cultural evolution is more rapid when innovations in local areas can be shared by diffusion. Thus, a reduction in the area suitable for agriculture and the isolation of suitable areas from one another will have a tendency to reduce the rate of intensification and make the evolution of agriculture less likely in any given unit of time. Since the slowest observed rates of intensification in the Holocene failed to result in agriculture until the European invasions of the last few hundred years, a sufficient slowing of the rate of evolution of subsistence could conceivably in itself explain the failure of agriculture to emerge before the Holocene. A slower rate of cultural evolution would also tend to prevent the rapid adaptation of intensive strategies during any favorable locales or periods that might have existed during the last glacial.
On present evidence we cannot determine whether aridity, low CO2 levels, millennial-scale climate variability, or sub-millennial-scale weather variation was the main culprit in preventing the evolution of agriculture. Low CO2 and climate variation would handicap the evolution of dependence on plant foods everywhere and were surely more significant than behavioral or technological obstacles. Hominids evolved as plant-using omnivores (Milton 2000) , and the basic technology for plant exploitation existed at least ten thousand years before the Holocene (BarYosef 1998). At least in favorable localities, appreciable use seems to have been made of plant foods, including large-seeded grasses, well back into the Pleistocene (Kislev et al. 1992) . Significantly, we believe, the use of such technology over spans of lastglacial time that were sufficient for successive waves of intensification of subsistence in the Holocene led to only minor subsistence intensification, compared to the Mesolithic, Neolithic, and their ever-moreintensive successors.
Subsistence Responses to Amelioration
As the climate ameliorated, hunter-gatherers in several parts of the world began to exploit locally abundant plant resources more efficiently, but only, current evidence suggests, during the B0lling-Aller0d period of near-interglacial warmth and stability. The Natufian sequence in the Levant is the best-studied and so far earliest example (e.g., Bar-Yosef and Valla 1991 ). One last siege of glacial climate, the Younger Dryas from 1 2,900 B.P. until 1 1,600 B.P., reversed these trends during the Late Natufian (e.g., GoringMorris and Belfer- Cohen 1998) . The Younger Dryas climate was appreciably more variable than the preceding Aller0d-B0lling and the succeeding Holocene (Grafenstein et al. 1999; Mayewski et al. 1993) . The ten abrupt, short, warm-cold cycles that punctuate the Younger Dryas ice record were perhaps felt as dramatic climate shifts all around the world. After 1 1,600 B.P., the Holocene period of relatively warm, wet, stable, CO2-rich environments began. Subsistence intensification and eventually agriculture followed. Thus, while not perfectly instantaneous, the shift from glacial to Holocene climates was a very large change, and took place much more rapidly than cultural evolution could track.
Might we not expect agriculture to have emerged in the last interglacial 130,000 years ago or even during one of the even older interglacials? No archaeological evidence has come to light suggesting the presence of technologies that might be expected to accompany forays into intensive plant collecting or agriculture at this time. Anatomically modern humans may have appeared in Africa as early as 130,000 years ago (Klein 1999: Ch.7), but they were not behaviorally modern. Humans of the last interglacial were uniformly archaic in behavior. Very likely, then, the humans of the last interglacial were neither cognitively nor culturally capable of evolving agricultural subsistence. However, climate might also explain the lack of marked subsistence intensification during previous interglacials. Ice cores from the thick Antarctic ice cap at Vostok show that each of the last four interglacials over the last 420,000 years was characterized by a short, sharp peak of warmth, rather than the 1 1,600-year-long stable plateau of the Holocene (Petit et al. 1999) . Further, the GRIP ice core suggests the last interglacial (1 30,000-80,000 B.P.) was more variable than the Holocene, although its lack of agreement with a nearby replicate core for this time period makes this interpretation tenuous (Johnsen et al. 1997) . On the other hand, the atmospheric concentration of CO2 was higher in the three previous interglacials than during the Holocene, and was sta-ble at high levels for about 20,000 years following the warm peak during the last interglacial. The highly continental Vostok site unfortunately does not record the same high-frequency variation in the climate as most other proxy climate records, even those in the southern hemisphere (Steig et al. 1998) . Some northern hemisphere marine and terrestrial records suggest that the last interglacial was highly variable while other data suggest a Holocene-length period of stable climates ca. 127,000-117,000 B.P. The details of subsistence responses to the Younger Dryas in the areas of early origins of agriculture will eventually produce a sharp test of the variability hypothesis. We suggest that the late Natufian de-intensification in response to the Younger Dryas was a retreat from the trend leading to agriculture and was unlikely to have produced the first steps toward domestication. More likely, the late Natufian preserved remnants of earlier, more intensive Natufian technology and social organization that served to start the Levantine transition to agriculture at an unusually advanced stage after the Younger Dryas ended. Events in the Younger Dryas time period also provide an opportunity to investigate the effects of CO2 concentration partly independently of climate variability. The rise in CO2 concentration in the atmosphere began two to three millennia before temperatures began to rise and continued to increase steadily through the Younger Dryas (Sowers and Bender 1995). The Younger Dryas period de-intensification of the Natufian suggests an independent effect of millennial and/or sub-millennial variability.
Population Growth Has the Wrong Time Scale
Cohen's (1977) influential book argued that slowly accumulating global-scale population pressure was responsible for the eventual origins of agriculture beginning at the 1 1,600 B.P. time horizon. He imagines, quite plausibly, that subsistence innovation is driven by increases in population density, but, implausibly we believe, that a long, slow buildup of population gradually drove people to intensify subsistence systems to relieve shortages caused by population growth, eventually triggering a move to domesticates. Looked at one way, population pressure is just the population growth part of the competitive ratchet. However, this argument fails to explain why pre-agricultural hunter-gatherer intensification and the transition to agriculture began in numerous locations after 11,600 years ago (Hayden 1995) . Assuming that humans were essentially modem by the Upper Paleolithic, they would have had 30,000 years to build up a population necessary to generate pressures for intensification. Given any reasonable estimate of the human intrinsic rate of natural increase under hunting-and-gathering conditions (somewhat less than 1% yr-1 to 3% yr-1), populations substantially below carTying capacity will double in a century or less, as we will see in the models that follow.
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dt K K where r is the "intrinsic rate of natural increase"-the rate of growth of population density when there is no scarcity-and K is the "carrying capacity," the equilibrium population density when population growth is halted by density-dependent checks. In the logistic equation, the level of population pressure is given by the ratio N/K. When this ratio is equal to zero the population grows at its maximum rate; there is no population pressure. When the ratio is one, density dependence prevents any population growth at all. It is easy to solve this equation and calculate the length of time necessary to achieve any level of population pressure, t = N/K. 10 km , 0 = 10 /10 = 10 . Then using equation 2 and again assuming r = .01, Eurasia will be filled to 99 percent of carrying capacity in about 1,400 years. The difference between increasing population pressure by a factor of 100 and by a factor of 10,000 is only about 500 years! Moreover, this calculation seriously over-estimates the amount of time that will pass before any segment of an expanding Eurasian population will experience population pressure because populations will approach carrying capacity locally long before the entire continent is filled with people. R. A. More realistic models that allow for density-dependent migration also yield a constant, wave-like advance of population (Murray 1989) , and although the rates vary, we believe that the same qualitative conclusion will hold. The Dynamics of Innovation. So far we have assumed that the carrying capacity of the environment is fixed (save where it is increased by fortuitous inventions). However, we know that people respond to scarcity caused by population pressure by intensifying production, for example, by shifting from less labor-intensive to more labor-intensive foraging, or by innovations that increase the efficiency of subsistence (Boserup 1981) . Since innovation increases carrying capacity, intuition suggests that it might therefore delay the onset of population pressure. However, as the model in Appendix B shows, this intuition, too, is faulty. and easy to develop, the population-pressure argument would lead us to expect Pleistocene populations to shift in and out of agriculture and other intensive strategies as they find themselves in subsistence crises due to environmental deterioration or in periods of plenty due to amelioration. Most likely, minor intensifications and de-intensifications were standard operating procedure in the Pleistocene. However, the time needed to progress much toward plant-rich strategies was greater than the fluctuating climate allowed, especially given CO2-and ariditylimited plant production.
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Cultural Evolution Has the Wrong Time Scale
The timing of the origin of agriculture might possibly be explained entirely by the rate of intensification by innovation. For example, Braidwood (1960) argued that it took some time for humans to acquire enough familiarity with plant resources to use them as a primary source of calories, and that this "settling in" process limited the rate at which agriculture evolved. This proposal may explain the post-Pleistocene timing of the development of agriculture. However, if we interpret his argument to be that the settling in process began with the evolution of behaviorally modern humans, the time scale is wrong again. There is no evidence that people were making significant progress at all toward agriculture for 30,000 years, and Braidwood's excavations at Jarmo show that some 4,000 years was enough to go from un-intensive hunting-and-gathering subsistence system to settled village agriculture in a fast case. Ten thousand years in the Holocene was ultimately sufficient for the development of plant-intensive gathering technologies or agriculture everywhere except in the coldest, plant-poor environments.
The Pattern Of Intensification Across Cases
Implicates Climate Change
We have argued that Malthusian processes lead to population pressure much more quickly than assumed by such writers as Cohen (1977) and that the rate of cultural "settling in" and intensification is faster than Braidwood (1960) imagined, but not fast enough to intensify more than a small distance toward agriculture in the highly variable environments of the Pleistocene. Thus, our hypothesis that the abrupt transition from glacial to Holocene climates caused the origin of agriculture requires that Holocene rates of intensification be neither too slow nor too fast.
Agriculturce Was Independently Evolved About 10 Times
The sample of origins is large enough to support some generalizations about the processes involved. Table 1 gives a rough time line for the origin of agriculture in seven fairly well-understood centers of domestication, two more controversial centers, three areas that acquired agriculture by diffusion, and two areas that were without agriculture until European 6 conquest. The list of independent centers is complete as far as current evidence goes, and while new centers are not unexpected, it is unlikely that the present list will double. Numerous areas acquired agriculture by diffusion (societies acquire most of their technological innovations by diffusion, not independent invention), so the three areas in Table 1 are but a small sample. The number of non-arctic areas without agriculture at European contact is small and the two listed, western North America and Australia, are the largest and best known. Two lines of evidence indicate that the seven centers of domestication are independent. First, the domesticates taken up in each center are distinctive and no evidence of domesticates from other centers turns up early in any of the sequences. For example, in the eastern North American center a sunflower, a goosefoot, marsh elder, an indigenous squash, and other local plants were taken into cultivation around The exact sequence of events also varies quite widely. For example, in the Near East, sedentism preceded agriculture, at least in the Levantine Natufian sequence, but in Mesoamerica crops seem to have been added to a hunting-and-gathering system that was dispersed and long remained rather mobile (MacNeish 1991:27-29). For example, squash seems to have been cultivated around by 10,000 B.P. in Mesoamerica, some 4,000 years before corn and bean domestication began to lead to the origin of a fully agricultural subsistence system (Smith 1997) . Some mainly hunting-and-gathering societies seem to have incorporated small amounts of domesticated plant foods into their subsistence system without this leading to full-scale agriculture for a very long time. Perhaps American domesticates were long used to provide specialized resources or to increase food security marginally (Richard Redding, personal communication) and initially raised human carrying capacities relatively little, thus operating the competitive ratchet quite slowly. According to MacNeish, the path forward through the whole intensification sequence varied considerably from case to case.
A Late Intensification of Plant Gathering Precedes Agriculture
In all known cases, the independent centers of domestication show a late sequence of intensification beginning with a shift from a hunter-gatherer subsistence system based upon low-cost resources using minimal technological aids to a system based upon the procurement and processing of high-cost resources, including small game and especially plant seeds or other labor-intensive plant resources, using an increasing range of chipped and ground stone tools (Hayden 1995 Early intensification of plant resource use would have tended to generate the same competitive ratchet as the later forms of intensification. Hunter-gatherers who subsidize hunting with plant-derived calories can maintain higher population densities, and thus will tend to deplete big game to levels that cannot sustain hunting specialists (Winterhalder and Lu 1997) . Upper Paleolithic people appear to be fully modern in their behavioral capacities (Klein 1999) . Important changes in subsistence technology did occur during the Upper Paleolithic, for example the development of the atlatl. Nevertheless, modern abilities and the operation of the competitive ratchet drove Upper Paleolithic populations only a relatively small distance down the path to the kind of heavy reliance on plant resources that in turn set the stage for domestication.
Braidwood's reasoning that pioneering agriculturalists would have gained their intimate familiarity with proto-domesticates first as gatherers is logical and supported by the archaeology. Once the climate ameliorated, the rate of intensification accelerated immediately in the case of the Near East. In other regions changes right at the PleistoceneHolocene transition were modest to invisible (Straus et al. 1996) . The full working out of agrarian subsistence systems took thousands of years. Indeed, modern breeding programs illustrate that we are still working out the possibilities inherent in agricultural subsistence systems.
The cases where Holocene intensification of plant gathering did not lead directly to agriculture are as interesting as the cases where it did. The Jomon of Japan represents one extreme (Imamura 1996) . Widespread use of simple pottery, a marker of welldeveloped agricultural subsistence in western Asia, was very early in the Jomon, contemporary with the latest Pleistocene Natufian in the Near East. By 11,000 yrs B.P., the Jomon people lived in settled villages, depended substantially upon plant foods, and used massive amounts of pottery. However, the Jomon domesticated no plants until rather late in the sequence. Seeds of weedy grasses are found throughout, but only in later phases (after about 3000 B.P.) do the first unambiguous domesticates occur, and these make up only a small portion of the seeds in archaeological contexts (Crawford 1997) . Sophisticated agriculture came to Japan with imported rice from the mainland only about 2,500 B.P. Interestingly, acorns were a major item of Jomon subsistence. The people of California were another group of sedentary hunter-gatherers that depended heavily on acorns. However, in California the transition to high plant dependence began much later than in the Jomon (Wohlgemuth 1996) . Millingstones for grinding small seeds became important after 4500 B.P., although seeds were of relatively minor importance overall. After 2800 B.P. acorns processed with mortars and pestles became an important subsistence component and small seeds faded in comparative importance. In the latest period, after 1200 B.P., quantities of small seeds were increasingly added back into the subsistence mix alongside acorns in a plant-dominated diet. Other peoples with a late onset of intensification include the Australians. The totality of cases tells us that any stage of the intensification sequence can be stretched or compressed by several thousand years but reversals are rare (Harris 1996; Price and Gebauer 1995). Farming did give way to hunting-and-gathering in the southern and eastern Great Basin of North America after a brief extension of farming into the region around 1000 B.P. (Lindsay 1986) . A similar reversal occurred in southern Sweden between 2400 and 1800 B.P. (Zvelebil 1996) . Horticultural Polynesian populations returned substantially to foraging for a few centuries while population densities built up on reaching the previously uninhabited archipelagos of Hawaii and New Zealand ( Kirch 1984) . Had intensification on plant resources been possible during the last glacial, even the slowest Holocene rates of intensification were rapid enough to produce highly visible archaeological evidence on the ten-millennium time scale, onethird or less time than Upper Paleolithic peoples lived under glacial climates.
More Intensive Technologies Tend to Spread
One successful and durable agricultural origin in the last glacial on any sizeable land mass would have been sufficient to produce a highly visible archaeological record, to judge from events in the Holocene. Once well-established agricultural systems existed in the Holocene, they expanded at the expense of hunting-and-gathering neighbors at appreciable rates (Bellwood 1996) . Ammerman and Cavalli-Sforza (1984) summarize the movement of agriculture from the Near East to Europe, North Africa and Asia. The spread into Europe is best documented. Agriculture reached the Atlantic seaboard about 6000 B.P. or about 4,000 years after its origins in the Near East. The regularity of the spread, and the degree to which it was largely a cultural diffusion process as opposed to a population dispersion as well, are matters of debate. Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994:296-299 ) argue that demic expansion by western Asians was an important process with the front of genes moving at about half the rate of agriculture. They imagine that pioneering agricultural populations moved into territories occupied by hunter-gatherers, and intermarried with the preexisting population. The then-mixed population in turn sent agricultural pioneers still deeper into Europe. They also suppose that the rate of spread was fairly steady, though clearly frontiers between hunter-gatherers and agriculturalists stabilized in some places (Denmark, Spain) for relatively prolonged periods. Zvelebil (1996) emphasizes the complexity and durability of frontiers between farmers and hunter-gatherers and the likelihood that in many places the diffusion of both genes and ideas about cultivation was a prolonged process of exchange across a comparatively stable ethnic and economic frontier. Further archaeological and paleogenetic investigations will no doubt gradually resolve these debates. Clearly, the spread process is at least somewhat heterogeneous.
Other examples of the diffusion of agriculture are relatively well documented. For example, maize domestication is dated to about 6200 B.P. in Central Mexico, spreading to the southwestern U.S. (New 
Conclusion
The large, rapid change in environment at the Pleistocene-Holocene transition set off the trend of subsistence intensification of which modem industrial innovations are just the latest examples. If our hypothesis is correct, the reduction in climate variability, increase in CO2 content of the atmosphere, and increases in rainfall rather abruptly changed the earth from a regime where agriculture was impossible everywhere to one where it was possible in many places. Since groups that use efficient, plant-rich subsistence systems will normally out-compete groups that make less efficient use of land, the Holocene has been characterized by a persistent, but regionally highly variable, tendency toward subsistence intensification. The diversity of trajectories taken by the various regional human sub-populations since = 1 1,600 B.P. are natural experiments that will help us elucidate the factors that control the tempo of cultural evolution and that generate historical contingency against the steady, convergent adaptive pressure toward ever more intense production systems. A long list of processes (Table 2) interacted to regulate the nearly unidirectional trajectory of subsistence intensification, population growth, and institutional change that the world's societies have followed in the Holocene. Notably, even the slowest evolving regions generated quite appreciable and archaeologically visible intensification, demanding some explanation for why similar trajectories are absent in the Pleistocene.
Those who are familiar with the Pleistocene often remark that the Holocene is just the "present interglacial." The return of climate variation on the scale that characterized the last glacial is quite likely if current ideas about the Milankovich driving forces of the Pleistocene are correct. Sustaining agriculture under conditions of much higher amplitude, highfrequency environmental variation than farmers currently cope with would be a considerable technical challenge. At the very best, lower C02 concentrations and lower average precipitation suggest that world average agricultural output would fall considerably.
Current anthropogenic global warming via greenhouse gases might at least temporarily prevent any return to glacial conditions. However, we understand the feedbacks regulating the climate system too poorly to have any confidence in such an effect. Current increases in CO2 threaten to elevate world temperatures to levels that in past interglacials apparently triggered a large feedback effect producing a relatively rapid decline toward glacial conditions (Petit et al. 1999) . The Arctic Ocean ice pack is currently thinning very rapidly (Kerr 1999) . A dark, open Arctic Ocean would dramatically increase the summer heat income at high northern latitudes and have large, difficult-to-guess impacts on the Earth's climate system. No one can yet estimate the risks we are taking of a rapid return to colder, drier, more variable environment with less CO2, nor evaluate exactly the threat such conditions imply for the continuation of agricultural production. Nevertheless, the intrinsic instability of the Pleistocene climate system, and the degree to which agriculture is likely dependent upon the Holocene stable period, should give one pause (Broecker 1997) . where y,, is the maximum per capita income, and I is a variable that represents the productivity of subsistence technology. Thus per capita income declines as population size increases, but for a given population size, greater productivity raises per capita income. As in the previous models, we assume that as population pressure, now measured as falling per capita income, increases, population growth decreases. In particular, assume: When per capita income is less than the threshold value Yi, people innovate, increasing the carrying capacity and therefore decreasing population pressure. When per capita income is greater than the threshold, they "de-innnovate." This may seem odd at first, but such abandonment of more efficient technology has been observed occasionally. The maximum rate at which innovation can occur is governed by the parameter a. If a small pioneer population enters an empty habitat, it experiences two distinct phases of expansion ( Figure 5) . Initially, per capita income is near the maximum, and population grows at the maximum rate. As population density increases, per capita income drops below yi, and the population begins to innovate, eventually reaching a steady state value PYS + ayi (B5) p+a The steady state per capita income is above the minimum for subsistence but below the threshold at which people experience population pressure and begin to innovate. At this steady state population growth continues at a constant rate, a(y1-y) (B6) p+a that is proportional to the rate of growth of subsistence efficiency.
